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A Baltic warning: What Ukraine war means for Europe—and the Russian perspective
Listen: On the GZERO World Podcast, we're bringing you two starkly different views on Ukraine's future and European security. First, Ian Bremmer speaks with Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braže about the growing security threats facing the Baltics—from cyberattacks and disinformation to undersea sabotage in the Baltic Sea. When an oil tanker linked to Russia’s shadow fleet recently severed a vital power cable between Estonia and Finland, it was a stark reminder of how hybrid warfare is playing out beyond the battlefield. Braže warns that Putin’s ambitions extend far beyond Ukraine, aiming to weaken US alliances and destabilize Europe. She also pushes back against claims that Ukraine's NATO ambitions provoked the war, calling them “complete nonsense,” and outlines why Latvia is boosting its defense spending to 5% of GDP.
The conversation then shifts to Moscow, where Bremmer speaks with former Russian colonel and ex-Carnegie Moscow Center director Dmitri Trenin. Once considered a pro-Western voice, Trenin’s views now align closely with the Kremlin. He argues that the fate of Ukraine should be decided primarily by Russia and the United States—not Ukraine or Europe.
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Transcript: A Baltic warning: What Ukraine war means for Europe—and the Russian perspective
Ian Bremmer:
Hello and welcome to the GZERO World Podcast. This is where you can find extended versions of my conversations on public television. I'm Ian Bremmer, and today I'm bringing you two very different perspectives on Moscow's expansionist aims in Europe. First up, Latvia's Foreign Minister Baiba Braže. She's watching her nation's vulnerable 176-mile border with Russia. The Baltic States are already facing increased deep-sea sabotage and a barrage of cyber-attacks by Moscow. The Baltics spend more on defense as a proportion of their GDP than most other NATO member nations. Latvia, for instance, went from spending just under 1% of its GDP on defense in 2014 to being on track to reach at least 5% by 2026. That's a NATO number that would melt even US President Donald Trump's heart. But could Latvia be the next domino to fall if Putin looks beyond Ukraine's borders?
Then we look to Moscow for a conversation with former Russian Colonel and former Carnegie Moscow Center director, Dmitri Trenin. In the early 2000s, Trenin was known for his pro-Western stance, but as Putin consolidated power, Trenin's views have fallen into alignment with the Kremlin. I don't endorse his opinions or anybody's for that matter, but I do think it's important to hear candid views from the Russian perspective, especially at a time when the Trump administration is more open than ever to that perspective, much to the chagrin of European allies. So let's get to it. First up, here's Latvia's Foreign Minister, Baiba Braže.
Foreign Minister Braže, wonderful to have you on the show.
Baiba Braže:
Thank you so much for having me.
Ian Bremmer:
You and I were both at the Munich Security Conference. There was, I would say, at least a sense of panic that the environment for Ukraine specifically and for NATO more broadly is under a lot of threat right now. How do you come away thinking about these issues?
Baiba Braže:
Let's separate. So one issue, Munich itself is sometimes too much like-minded among the participants. So I actually welcome a diversity of opinions, also in the big speeches that is just not what we expect. But like the speech of the vice president that created certain emotions and certain sort of reactions and the debates. And I think that is helpful, even though, in my assessment, it was an internal political speech for the vice president more than anything else. But it also gave an important messaging for us in Europe, including on the issues that we fully support. More defense spending, more responsibility for Europe on certain issues related to security defense, and more self-conviction and ability to believe in ourselves and the way we do things.
So while the European and US relationship, including with the Baltic States, is crucially important because the interests are common between Europe and the US once you look at it. It is a stability, it is a security of our countries. We are the biggest trading partners, we are the biggest investment. US is the biggest investment destination for European pension funds, securities and so on, so forth. And Europe is the biggest destination for America's services.
So that relationship is not only about security defense. We have been united through NATO, through other alliances, but also the healthy economic relationships that is there. So that has formed that mutual sort of understanding, sometimes misunderstanding, sometimes competition, and that's normal. That's normal. But again, on the European side, I think we have relied very much on the sort of world being as it is, everything will be fine. We don't have to spend much on defense, despite whatever's happening.
Ian Bremmer:
Well, which has not been, of course, the Latvian position at all.
Baiba Braže:
No, for the Baltic States-
Ian Bremmer:
For 10 years now, you've been doing-
Baiba Braže:
Absolutely.
Ian Bremmer:
... an awful lot, right?
Baiba Braže:
For the Baltic States, we are 107-year old countries, states. Our independence was in 1918, as was with Finland and a number of other countries in Europe. But for us, 50 years we were occupied by the Soviet Union. US never accepted that occupation. So when we regained the independence, we restored what we were good at. Strong institutions, lively democracy, very digitally advanced societies. Everything is literally provided for online. I do my tax submission within a few minutes from my phone. That's the way it works.
But in the same time, of course, we were very serious about security and defense, and that has never gone away. So we started spending 2% of GDP, now we are 3.7%. We'll move to 4%, we'll move to 5% gradually to make sure that absorptions, the needs, the capabilities are there because you cannot just create also bottlenecks and so on and so forth. But also we need industry in Europe. European defense industry is not yet the levels that we would like it to be. We also buy a lot from the US and we would like to have more industry capacity also here to produce what we need.
Ian Bremmer:
There's a transatlantic relationship, there's the Ukraine relationship. Let's talk first about Ukraine for a few moments. I assume you would welcome a peace negotiation on Ukraine that could end the war, but do you think we are on a path right now to a sustainable peace negotiation with Ukraine?
Baiba Braže:
The peace negotiation itself is not yet there, in our understanding. The elements are being put together. We all want peace, everybody. Ukraine wants peace. We want peace. NATO wants peace. US wants peace. Everybody wants peace except Putin. Putin thinks he's winning the war. Even though within three years, nuclear-armed 440 million, Russia has not been able to take more than fifth of Ukrainian territory since 2014. So he's not getting his objectives through war. So we have to be very careful that within that peace negotiation, Putin is not able to get his objectives also.
And one of his objectives is to weaken US power, to weaken US friendships with its allies, to weaken US power whether in Indo-Pacific or in Europe or elsewhere. So we have to be very aware that there's a lot of stuff that Russians are trying to achieve that is not directly related to the peace in Ukraine.
Ian Bremmer:
Now, is he getting what he wants? I see at the United Nations, for example, the United States is promoting not a Ukrainian resolution, but a resolution that's supported by Russia and by Russian allies, and not by America's European allies, by example. How do you respond to that? How do you relate to that?
Baiba Braže:
That was a complicated process yesterday. There was the US resolution, Ukrainian resolutions that were supported, and that's annual resolutions that large membership of the UN supports was submitted much earlier.
Ian Bremmer:
This was on the third anniversary of the Ukraine war-
Baiba Braže:
Of the war.
Ian Bremmer:
... February 24th, yes.
Baiba Braže:
Of Russia's war against Ukraine, yeah.
Ian Bremmer:
Yes.
Baiba Braže:
So there was a lot of diplomatic sort of back and forth happening yesterday. And again, I'm not commenting on US positions. US explained its vote and the process, so it was all out there. We were pretty straightforward. We voted for Ukrainian resolution, we voted for the US resolution as amended, referenced to the UN Charter and other issues. We were in favor of both initiatives, as you can see in our votes.
The fact that US ended up voting against the first resolution and abstaining on the second, again, that is a choice in the General Assembly can happen. We are not making it into something more than that it is. But again, I think it's important to remember the larger issues here, which relate to Russia's real objectives in this process. And that is to split US from its allies and weaken American political and economic.
Ian Bremmer:
Is it plausible to talk about a NATO path for Ukraine when the United States is saying that they won't support it? Is it possible to talk about territorial integrity for all of Ukraine when the most powerful country says they won't support it?
Baiba Braže:
I think it's important to remember is that when the first invasion in 2014 by Russia into Ukraine took place, Ukraine was officially neutral country in its constitution. It didn't have NATO objective, there was no NATO discussion. There was nothing happening. Russia invaded, so it was not about NATO. In 2022, again, Ukraine had changed the constitution with putting the objective of joining NATO one day among its objectives, but there was no negotiation. There was literally no debate about Ukraine.
Ian Bremmer:
There was no membership action plan. It had not moved. Nobody-
Baiba Braže:
It had not moved.
Ian Bremmer:
... was interested in [inaudible 00:10:06].
Baiba Braže:
So there was, again, all that propaganda about NATO being the reason why Russia attacked Ukraine is complete nonsense. Having said that, Washington Treaty, NATO Treaty Article 10 provides European country that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security and which has a consensus among allies can join NATO. So there are three elements for a member to join. As we remember from Finland, Sweden, it took a while for Sweden, longer than Finland to join.
Ian Bremmer:
The Turks were causing some trouble.
Baiba Braže:
Because there was no consensus.
Ian Bremmer:
That's right.
Baiba Braže:
So again, for Ukraine, it will be the same. They have to fulfill the three conditions and nobody can deny them the right to have that objective. It's Ukraine's agency. They can have a wish to be a member of NATO, but it's up to the NATO members to accept it or not.
So US, as a member of NATO, will always have a voice or other countries will always have a voice. For now, I don't see there is a consensus personally. But again, that doesn't mean that Ukraine's objective should be eliminated. That is their choice at the end.
As I always say, I was first Latvia's ambassador to Indonesia. And whether Indonesia wants to be member of ASEAN or not or member of other organizations, OECD or others, it's for the members of those organizations to decide. Membership doesn't have to be part of the peace deal, I don't believe it will be. But again, Ukraine will not change its objective, and that is a totally different type of perspective.
Ian Bremmer:
You said that the Russians believe they're winning the war. Why do you think that is? Because we've talked about 100,000 dead, Russian soldiers.
Baiba Braže:
Oh, it will be a million this year.
Ian Bremmer:
Dead.
Baiba Braže:
Dead and wounded in action.
Ian Bremmer:
And you're talking about casualties.
Baiba Braže:
Yep, and wounded in action.
Ian Bremmer:
Also wounded, it's over 700,000 now, including casualties.
Baiba Braže:
865,000.
Ian Bremmer:
It's an astonishing number. It's a staggering number. The Russians clearly are prepared to continue to fight, but why do you think that Putin believes he's winning the war?
Baiba Braže:
The war machine is ongoing and it's very difficult to stop it. And we know it from the past, from Second World War, that's how it was. And it's simple as that.
It also has allowed him to consolidate his power, all the instruments of power within Russia oriented to its war. Politics, economy, religion, media, private sector, all have consolidated around the war. But we clearly know, there are indicators which shows that there are problems. The society, the talks, the conversations happening on social media, on classified channels in Telegram, elsewhere. Society in Russia, even though it's not about standing up or protesting or anything, is clearly understanding it's a war and that is costing them quite a bit. And you mentioned the casualties, the wounded in action. If the projection happens with more than 1,000 a day killed or severely wounded, it's going to be a million Russians this year.
Ian Bremmer:
But it's not going to change the view.
Baiba Braže:
So that is, then the other part is how long can this work? And war economy, as we know, is not a productive economy. It's not like you sell those old tanks. You take them out somewhere from the storage, polish them up, send them to the front where they're eliminated. You produce ammunition, again, that's all eliminated. So it's not a productive economy in Russia, and that's why you see the high level of inflation, more than 10%. That's why you see the interest rates above 20%. That's why you see ruble's value losing its value, almost half of its value. So the economy is a house of cards. It's on a shaky ground. So if the ground becomes shakier, there will be consequences for that.
People say visually, you don't see that in Moscow and Petersburg. Maybe. That's not the point. The point is what is systemic indicators? And it's quite clear that serious analysts, serious experts looking into it are quite unanimous that this cannot last.
For now, Russia has financed war from their energy exports, oil, gas mostly, but also resources, exports, natural resources, fertilizers, others. So both US and EU and others have put quite stringent sanctions on them. So there is a new package in the EU, including on sanctions on the ports, airports, these oil shadow fleet ships, but also there will be new tariffs on fertilizers from Russia. So actually cutting down on those energy exports from Russia will bring peace much sooner. And if there would be one advice to the US administration I would give is really go after the Russian income.
Ian Bremmer:
Starting with the 90-minute phone call between Trump and Putin persisting, expanding with the Riyadh meeting between the Americans and the Russians, there has been a move towards rapprochement. There has been a move towards direct engagement, normalization of relations between the US and Russia. What I want to ask you is if that process continues, if we actually see a breakthrough between Putin and Trump, a bilateral breakthrough, how do you think the Europeans should respond to that?
Baiba Braže:
All the questions with starting with "if" is a speculation.
Ian Bremmer:
That's true.
Baiba Braže:
So I tend not to answer those, and especially with regard to such serious issues as these. But Europe is involved. Europe, again, we talk all the time with Ukrainians, we consult with Ukrainians, both in terms of getting their knowledge, understanding of the situation, their interests and so on, so forth, but also presenting our interests.
We talk with the US partners all the time, all the time. Yesterday, you saw President Macron was in the White House, Keir Starmer from the UK-
Ian Bremmer:
This week.
Baiba Braže:
... will be there. Yeah. President Duda was at the CPAC. So there is a lot of engagement, it's not like Europe is isolated. There's a lot of, lot of, lot of conversations and also at other levels.
And then we also know that P5, the permanent five of the UN Security Council, the nuclear states, do have a forum where they talk to each other, which is, again, good. In our view, it's good. It's good that nuclear states talk among themselves because those issues are too serious just to be left not handled.
Again, any outcome from peace negotiation, and we welcome that peace, it has to be both lasting, meaning that peace holds. So the elements have to be there to prevent a restart of hostilities, which would mean probably withdrawal of forces in a certain distance, which would probably mean moving back certain capabilities. There will be other elements. The next question will be do we need international presence in Ukraine?
Ian Bremmer:
On the ground, which has been-
Baiba Braže:
Where? How? What? And that's something that, again, we don't want to speculate about because the way it works is that you ask your military commanders to provide military options, military advice. What type of force? Then the civilians, the politicians will have to choose which of those options for that political objective is the most appropriate. And then the next point will be starting planning. And then the next point will be what forces where and how? What enablers do we need? So it's a-
Ian Bremmer:
And some of those enablers will need to come from the United States.
Baiba Braže:
Preferably yes, because the US, of course, has clearly said that they don't see boots on the ground from the US, which is, again, a political choice. But from other hand, and we have heard it also in direct conversations, that obviously certain US capabilities, I'm not going to name them, but you can imagine, provide for early warning situational awareness and so on, so forth.
So there has to be both the political side and place, take into account what Ukraine's views are on that. But there also has to be, if there is a decision on having some security presence, military options that work. I don't think we are there yet, but that's the thinking we have in Latvia. We have covered and discussed that quite at length nationally. There are no decisions yet, but again, those parameters. What is also important-
Ian Bremmer:
One thing I wanted to ask you about.
Baiba Braže:
Yeah.
Ian Bremmer:
In the context of all of this, everyone's talking about the politics and the statements, and Trump meets with Putin and oh my God, they're having a conversation. But in the actual day-to-day operations of America's military engagement with Latvia, with the Baltics, that continues to be very robust today. You have not experienced any change, have you?
Baiba Braže:
We have a long-lasting, perfect relationship with the US, starting from our peoples. There are large communities of Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Poles here in the US. Very active politically, very active economically, very successful. So there is that relationship among the people.
There is the political relationship. We are some of the most pro-American societies that we have in Europe. We don't have a problem with being pro-American. We are quite proud about it because the ideas of freedom, the liberty sustained us throughout the Soviet occupation. We always believed in freedom, we always were inspired by the US concept of freedom, and that actually matters for us. So the voice of America, the Radio Free Europe that were broadcasting into the Baltic States during the occupation actually provided the very strong inspiration for us.
But also economically, all our energy, about 80% of gas, LNG that we have comes from the US. And we think there is even more potential, about 20% is Norwegian. So I think there can be longer term deals. We want Europe to buy more because unfortunately, we have seen Russians, through the shadow oil fleet, increasing their LNG exports into the EU, which gives them money to fight.
Ian Bremmer:
Gives them money, absolutely. Yeah.
Baiba Braže:
To war. To finance the war in Ukraine. So I think that relationship with the whole of European Union has to be strengthened. We buy diesel for our strategic reserves from Texas. Lithuanians have a MOU on small nuclear reactors, joint sort of interest. There's a very rich economic relationship. Also on the tech companies, on the drones, we have US investment, we have investment here in the US. So it's all across the board.
And then militarily, obviously, the Baltics are some of the most capable specific types of militaries that we have. So with the US, we're in the same operation in Afghanistan among special operation forces. And that is something that doesn't happen unless you have the closest relationship, the closest reliance on each other because your lives depend on that. So there were Latvians saving American lives, and the other way around. There's even a movie made about Latvian soldiers working with the Americans in a particularly difficult post in Afghanistan.
So that, for us, is sort of self-explainable, that our relationship with the US is strong and it should be maintained strong. Our membership in NATO, of course, provides also for working with the other allies as close as possible. So we have more than 6,000 troops next year from 13 different allied countries, and that's on top of the US.
Ian Bremmer:
And these are rotating troops in the Baltic States because they're not allowed to have permanent positions in the Baltics, there was an agreement. But nonetheless, certainly providing-
Baiba Braže:
It's a NATO-
Ian Bremmer:
... a backstop, security-
Baiba Braže:
Right.
Ian Bremmer:
... for the Baltic States.
Baiba Braže:
It's a multinational brigade. It's pretty permanent in terms of having that headquarters, having the command force, having that bases. And a lot of US troops come in and rotate, and that is the way exercises take place because what NATO worked on is, of course, to have investment in that early warning and situational awareness to understand what is happening not only in the east but also in the south with all the terrorist groups and developments in Syria and elsewhere. But also then to develop defense plans that correspond to reality. So rapid movements, force structure, capabilities that need to be there to make sure that deterrence is strong.
Ian Bremmer:
We've talked about Europe and Ukraine and the United States. Russia is your adversary. I've seen a lot of the asymmetric attacks against the Baltic States through Telegram, for example, money being paid to engage in acts of arson and vandalism, thousands and thousands of these things. I've seen the attacks on the fiber cables going from the Baltics to the Nordics, Balticconnector, all of this. Are you fighting essentially a war against Russia? Or is Russia conducting a war against your country right now?
Baiba Braže:
The Russian concept of warfare includes sub-conventional warfare, which is being conducted. It's not only about the Baltics or Europe, it's everywhere. Those are what used to be called active measures in the Cold War times, but it's, as I said, sub-conventional. And that's part of the warfare and that is what is happening, so we take it seriously.
The new element a few years ago was illegal migrants pushed across our border and we actually built a wall. We did build a wall, both in terms of military capabilities, having the proper sort of strength to delay any movement if necessary, but also for border security. So with all the monitoring capabilities, with technology to make sure that that is addressed. We have invested a lot in our internal security services. So to enable that capability to monitor and understand the activity, because once you understand that, again, sub-threshold activity, it's much easier to be ready and respond.
And there, as you said, there were sabotage. The security service discovered the perpetrators within 24 hours. All right. Constant cyber attacks via cybercrime, but also trying to go after critical infrastructure. So there, we have developed quite a number of new types of activities that we do. We go cyber hunting and sort of variety of other things. And we have identified particular people who'd done that.
So I don't know if you noticed, but last month, we actually imposed sanctions by the EU on three Russian military intelligence offices who had perpetrated particular cyber attack. On the subsea infrastructure, the crucial point is the readiness, exercising and being ready. And it depends what type of infrastructure it is. On that fiber cable, data cables that we had, again, we were able to identify perpetrator, together with other countries, within 12 hours.
Ian Bremmer:
The ship in question.
Baiba Braže:
The ship. That was detained.
Ian Bremmer:
And you mentioned the shadow fleet, that's what we're talking about here.
Baiba Braže:
Well, there was also a shadow fleet vehicle, which was not a perpetrator on this occasion. It was a different ship, but Swedes detained it because it was in their economic zone. It was Latvian fiber cable, data cable. But it involved cooperation of law enforcement agencies, maritime agencies, navies, NATO, because there is a NATO operation in the Baltic seas that is taking place, to basically monitor, understand, and then go after the perpetrator.
And it's a criminal case because it's a civilian object. So now the next stage is how you recoup the expenses. But the most important thing was actually that the end users didn't feel anything because we had done the testing preparations. So there was no effect on data users because of preparations for a scenario like that.
On Christmas day, there was another cable broken and that was much more serious. That was gas, that was electricity between Estonia and Finland. And their repairs are much more difficult. And if a second cable like that would have been broken, that would have been more difficult for the Baltic States to disconnect from the Russian electricity network.
Ian Bremmer:
So how concerned are you about the potential of an actual conventional Russian invasion into the Baltic States?
Baiba Braže:
Listen, we are members of NATO. It would be a totally different type of war if the butcher in Kremlin would try to restart something like that, begin a war against NATO. So having said that, in the same time, what we do, what is our responsibility to have, as NATO, those deterrence capabilities both in place, to have the will to demonstrate that ability to be strong. And that's what we are doing.
So for now, we don't see that scenario happening. The task for all of us is not to exclude anything. So to be ready, to be prepared, to exercise, to test, and to make sure it doesn't happen, and to be serious about this sub-conventional warfare threshold to make sure that we deal with various threats, including in the information space properly. So that would be my short long answer on this question. But again, as we discussed with the executive president of the Palantir, lots of mistakes are made by the failure of imagination. And that's why it's so important not to exclude any scenarios and to be ready for whatever happens.
Ian Bremmer:
Foreign Minister Braže, thanks for being on the show.
Baiba Braže:
Thank you so much for having me.
Ian Bremmer:
And now to Moscow and my conversation with the former director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Dmitri Trenin. Dmitri Trenin, great to see you again.
Dmitri Trenin:
Great to see you again.
Ian Bremmer:
Talk a little bit to me about how different you see the Trump administration and its orientation towards Russia, both compared to Biden and compared to Trump last time around.
Dmitri Trenin:
Well, I think it did not feel like that immediately after inauguration. But a few days later what transpired, at least in my perception, was that this president is really opening a new chapter in US foreign policy. It's like stopping a foreign policy direction that was, say, ideologically conditioned, that was aiming at shoring up the hegemony of the West, of the collective West and taking on the array of authoritarian leaders that opposed the West. And now we see someone who, I would say, has joined the movement toward multipolarity. Someone who is banking on the United States actually leading the process and is reestablishing an order or establishing a new order with the United States as the strongest member of the international community due to its strength, its size, what the United States has as a nation, rather than as a champion of some ideological movement or some geopolitical construct. And that calls for essentially reversing the long-term trend in US foreign policy, supporting the periphery, often at the expense of the metropolitan area, which is the United States. And that is, I think, remarkable.
He also sees the countries on the other side, say, China, Russia, India, and other non-Western nations, as distinct entities rather than members of some anti-Western club or the axis or something like that. So that is truly remarkable. That's a new beginning for the United States foreign policy in my view.
Ian Bremmer:
Now, Trump has also taken on directly a number of talking points on Russia and Ukraine that would've been almost unimaginable for most Americans even a few months ago. Saying basically that the Ukrainians are responsible for starting the war, that Zelensky himself is a dictator, that elections are required. Do you think that this is... I assume you agree with all of this, of course. But do you think that this is, this kind of whiplash in policy from the United States is sustainable? Is it something that the Russians believe in?
Dmitri Trenin:
Well, I wonder. I think that these developments have surprised not only most people in the United States, but also a lot of people here. And I think it's still too early to basically pass judgment on how sustainable this new foreign policy course is. And I'm keeping an open mind.
It's remarkable what President Trump has done by challenging some of the dogmas of US foreign policy in the past. And it's so courageous, no one has done it. And maybe in that, he falls into a very rare category of American revolutionary presidents that would include, in my humble view, that would include FDR, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, that would include Abraham Lincoln, and, of course, the first president of the United States. But there have not been so many presidents who dare to attack the dogmas that people have been living under for a long time.
Ian Bremmer:
And he is, I think he is seen by his supporters as a revolutionary. I thought it was very interesting when Putin was asked who he thought should be the next president. He talked about Biden as his preference because of Biden's experience. People were very skeptical about that, they thought that he was not really being honest with them. I assume that you believe that Trump is clearly a much better president for Russia than Biden ever could have been.
Dmitri Trenin:
Well, it's still too early to pass judgment on Mr. Trump's second presidency. There were very big expectations in Russia when he first assumed the presidency of the United States back in 2017. I believe that when Putin was talking about Biden as his preferred candidate, well, that certainly was a case of trolling both Biden and the American public and the American media, but there's some truth to it.
Biden and Harris, and let me be very frank with you, I think were taking the United States down. And in that sense, if you see the United States primarily as your adversary, you would be pleased to have a president who looked like the late Konstantin Chernenko, the-
Ian Bremmer:
General Secretary.
Dmitri Trenin:
Leader of the Soviet Union preceding Gorbachev, who was walking dead physically during his brief tenure as the head of the Soviet Communist Party. Or Kamala Harris was seen as totally empty. And Trump, of course, was basically seen as unpredictable. Unpredictable, like a loose gun that could fire in very different directions. And, of course, the memories of his first presidency were not all that good. He took the US-Russia relationship to the lowest level at that time. Of course, Biden drew it even lower, but at that time, that was the absolute low in the post-Cold War period.
Mr. Trump may have been, there may have been secret hopes about Trump, but I don't think that the people at the top of the Russian system actually are given to hoping much. They are very pragmatic people and people with very few illusions about other politicians.
Ian Bremmer:
So what do we think about the Ukraine ceasefire process? Do you think that the Russians can do a deal over the head of the Ukrainians that's sustainable just with the United States? Is that the best possible format for Russia? Just let Putin and Trump work it out and you don't need the Europeans and the Ukrainians to be a part of it?
Dmitri Trenin:
Yeah, I will challenge you on this ceasefire thing. Russia is not interested in the ceasefire. I can see why Ukraine may be interested. I can see why Europe may be interested. I can see why Mr. Trump is interested in a ceasefire. But Russia is interested in a lasting piece. Russia is interested in its key national security objectives being met as a result of the Ukraine settlement. We're very far from that. So if the plan is only to have a ceasefire and then talk later, I don't think it will work.
Ian Bremmer:
Well, and is that why Trump has been essentially throwing concessions Russia's way before any real negotiations happening on Ukraine not being allowed to join NATO, on a resolution in the United Nations that doesn't have territorial integrity of Ukraine, essentially pushing the Ukrainians to recognize they're going to have to give up territory to the Russians? All of these things they are not the extent of Russian demands, of course. We could talk about a lot more what Russian demands have been. But they are certainly, again, a very different position than you would've heard from any other potential American president. Do you think that's because Trump understands that he's quite far from getting the Russians to accept the ceasefire?
Dmitri Trenin:
Well, I think he should understand by now that a ceasefire alone would fall grossly short of the minimum of what Russia would settle on. So it's a nice thing, of course, to have the president of the United States propose a resolution that is, let's say, I wouldn't call it a pro-Russian resolution, but it's certainly more objective, it's not pro-Ukrainian. And that the rift that has formed between President Trump, on the one hand, the United States government of today on the one hand, and then the Europeans and then the Ukrainians, certainly this is seen as positive in Russia.
But I don't think that people will fall for that. There are some nice gestures like this resolution or a friendly invitation that I don't think has any meaning today to invite Russia back to the G7 group. All these things are seen as gestures, and they are positive gestures, and they're not dismissed, but they're taken as gestures. And Russia will not seek to return to the G7. Russia will not settle on a ceasefire in Ukraine if that's the end of the road. But working with Trump on a wider set of issues, not just Ukraine, but other things, of which there are quite a few, could be very interesting. And you can see that the discussions between US and Russian officials have so far focused on non-Ukraine-related issues.
Ian Bremmer:
I do. So when we talk about Ukraine-related issues specifically, should those negotiations include the Ukrainians or should they just be the US and Russia?
Dmitri Trenin:
Well, I think the US and Russia, again, we're talking about the real power distribution in the world, or at least in this part of the world. There are two countries that have agency in the Ukraine conflict. One is the United States and the other one is Russia. Ukraine is fighting on the ground and it's offering stubborn resistance to the Russian forces. So you cannot say Ukraine doesn't exist, it does.
But on the political side, Ukrainians do not matter much because they are heavily dependent on the United States, to a lesser extent, far lesser extent on Europe. Ukraine would not be able to hit any targets inside Russia without US intel support. Ukraine will not be able to fire, except just a few rounds, had the United States stopped its arms deliveries to Ukraine. So Ukraine is a country heavily dependent. Talk about Ukraine sovereignty, and it does not exist.
Ian Bremmer:
So a long-term sustainable peace needs to be determined by the Americans and Russians largely themselves. The Europeans shouldn't be a part of that because they just don't have any power, from your perspective.
Dmitri Trenin:
Well, I'm talking about the framework for peace.
Ian Bremmer:
Yeah.
Dmitri Trenin:
The framework should be, I think should be decided by the United States, the broad framework, and Russia. Now, of course, there will have to be negotiations with Ukraine. Ukraine will have to agree to certain things. And it takes a Ukrainian head of state, a legal, legitimate head of state to sign all those documents at the end of the day.
The Europeans are certainly involved in any or should be involved in any discussion pertaining to security in that part of Eurasia, if you like. And I think it was said today on the Russian side, Russian officials said, I think it was Lavrov who said it, that, of course, Europe and Ukraine will be part of the negotiation process at a certain juncture when it comes to the matters in their competence. Sorry, but again, there are two powerful countries that have agency, and it is essentially a proxy war, proxy conflict between America and Russia. And it can be resolved, again, in broad strokes by the Russians and the Americans.
Ian Bremmer:
The other thing, you said that the UN resolution was more objective, not necessarily pro-Russian, but wasn't pro-Ukrainian. One thing that I did find notable about the US-backed resolution is that it does not include any reference to Ukrainian territorial integrity. And of course, this is a principle the United States has at least nominally promoted since the establishment of the United Nations. And yet with the Trump administration right now, it's not just Ukraine, it's also the Panama Canal, it's Greenland, more fancifully Canada. There are lots of places where the United States is showing that perhaps it's less interested in territorial integrity. Do you think, Dmitri, that the principle of territorial integrity deserves to be dust-binned and that what we're really talking about is that powerful countries need to make the rules and everybody else has to just kind of deal with it?
Dmitri Trenin:
Well, my short answer is that no, I don't think that the powerful countries will have a right to redraw the map of the world as they wish. I don't think that's a good recipe for the future of the world order.
On the other hand, as someone who has been studying world history for a long time, you have to agree that borders between countries of the world have been changing all the time. And to pretend that somehow now the borders that exist now are here forever or cannot be changed except by some sort of an internationally approved referendum or something like that, this is all fantasy. Borders are being changed, they will continue to change.
And I'll tell you one thing. Had there had been no NATO thing with regard to Ukraine, there had been no attempt for Ukraine to be drawn into the NATO alliance or Ukranian leadership's attempt to be invited into NATO, had there been no Russophobia in Ukraine, Crimea would be Ukrainian today. The borders of Ukraine of 1991 would still be standing.
Ian Bremmer:
Ukraine should not have had the right as a sovereign country to enter into an alliance with other countries. They should not have that piece of sovereignty because they're weak. A powerful Ukraine maybe could have, but a weak Ukraine just shouldn't be able, because Russia's more powerful, they can stop them, that's what we're showing, right?
Dmitri Trenin:
Well, look, no major power would tolerate another major power having a proxy to threaten it at close distance. You're talking, think about the importance of Belgium for the United Kingdom traditionally, since the early 19th century until the First World War. Imagine an American adversary building... Why should you imagine? Just remember the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when Khrushchev went too far and almost provoked America into launching its nuclear missiles against the Soviet Union, and with a likely result of ending life on Earth. That lesson should be learned.
There are things called international law. But then there are things called history of international relations. That history suggests that some things are better never tried. And this is one of those cases, if you think that you are over-powerful, that your potential opponent is too weak, you are risking, you're taking a gamble. And I think there was some sort of a Russian roulette that certainly, the previous administration was playing with, was playing, and that was a nuclear Russian roulette.
Ian Bremmer:
Now, of course, because of the Russia war in Ukraine, it certainly seems very unlikely Ukraine is joining NATO. But Finland did join NATO and Sweden joined NATO and their populations and their governments had no interest in joining NATO before that. So I understand that Russia's in a stronger position in Ukraine right now, but in terms of having proxies of the Americans on their border that are hostile, there's a lot more of that now than there was before the war.
Dmitri Trenin:
Well, look, again, in human affairs, unlike in physics, you can compare things, but comparing, as they say, comparaison n'est pas raison.
Ian Bremmer:
Comparison is not an explanation. Your French is easily better than mine, absolutely, Dmitri. The Russians have always wanted to be secret Europeans. We know this, it's part of the problem.
Dmitri Trenin:
On the borders of the Soviet Union, so was Turkey. And there were no plans in Moscow to occupy Norway just because of that, or to occupy Turkey just because of that. Ukraine, in many ways, is a special case. And I know it's something that's not recognized and not even reported widely in the West. But the Russophobia, the very practical Russophobia that was practiced by ultra-nationalist forces in Ukraine was one of the things that certainly drove the decision to intervene.
And you may disagree with that kind of thing, with caring for people of your own ethnic group, your own cultural group, people who only recently were your compatriots, if they're maltreated and repressed in all sorts of ways. But in practical politics, it does matter. The United States went to, well, didn't go into war, but it certainly intervened in Latin America many times on the pretext of American students, American citizens being maltreated. And of course, the United States is not unique in caring for its own.
Ian Bremmer:
So you know that I also have the Latvian Foreign Minister appearing on this show. And of course, the Baltic States are deeply concerned that after après Ukraine le déluge, let's put it, if we're quoting French. Your president, of course, swore up and down to the French president, the German chancellor, that he absolutely wasn't going to invade, or as you used the term, intervene in Ukraine a few days before. It turned out he was lying about that. But will you at least tell the Latvian foreign minister that Russia absolutely is not going to invade the Baltics after they take a chunk of Ukraine?
Dmitri Trenin:
Well, I think it's a big lie to say that Ukraine as a stepping stone to Russia reestablishing control over the territories of the former Soviet Union, former Russian empire, or the former Warsaw Pact. It's a big lie that's been used for ulterior purposes by some ruling circles in the West, in my view. And it works as a powerful facilitator of European integration because that's the barbarians at the door, that kind of thing. It resonates with a lot of people in Europe, but it doesn't make it less of a lie.
Now, I don't think that there was ever a plan or even an idea seriously taken by the Russian leadership of invading or intervening in the Baltic republics or in Finland, since you brought up Finland a few minutes ago. No, I don't see that, absolutely don't see that happening. And Ukraine, the war in Ukraine is about Ukraine. As I said, had there been no provocation that was NATO enlargement and maltreatment of Russians, suppressing the Russian language, and a few other things, Ukraine would still be at peace. It would be able to milk both cows, the cow to the East in Russia, the cow to the West in the European Union. Be happy about that. But unfortunately, for the Ukrainian people, those who were in charge of Ukraine chose otherwise.
Ian Bremmer:
Well, Dmitri, I want to thank you very much for joining us again on GZERO World, and if relations keep going the way they are, you're probably going to see me directly in New York pretty soon.
Dmitri Trenin:
Thank you, Ian.
Ian Bremmer:
That's it for today's edition of the GZERO World Podcast. Do you like what you heard? Of course you do. Why not make it official? Why don't you rate and review GZERO World five stars, only five stars, otherwise, don't do it, on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. Tell your friends.
Ukraine and European security in the Trump era: Insights from Sen. Elissa Slotkin
Listen: Three years into the invasion of Ukraine, and amid the Trump administration’s rapid shift in US-Russia relations, can European and NATO allies continue to rely on the United States for support? On the GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmer is on the ground in Germany on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference for a hard look at the future of European security with US Senator Elissa Slotkin. World leaders and diplomats gathered at the annual conference to discuss global security challenges, but the biggest story, by far, in Munich was the news of President Trump’s 90-minute phone call with Vladimir Putin, which upended three years of US-led efforts to isolate Russia diplomatically. The Trump administration is emphatic: it wants an end to the war and that Europe is responsible for maintaining peace in any ceasefire deal. But can Europe guarantee Ukraine’s security without US support? Later in the episode, GZERO’s Tony Maciulis speaks with Alina Polyakova, President and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis, to discuss the reaction to the Trump-Putin call and growing fears that NATO allies will be left on the sidelines of peace negotiations in Ukraine.
Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.
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Palestinian UN Ambassador on Trump's radical Gaza plan and the Israel-Hamas ceasefire
Listen: On the GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmer sits down with Palestinian Ambassador to the UN Riyad Mansour to discuss the future of Gaza, Trump’s radical proposal, and what Palestinians want. As a fragile ceasefire holds, Trump has suggested that the US take over Gaza and turn it into the “Riviera of the Middle East” while relocating displaced Gazans elsewhere. The idea has been widely rejected by America’s Middle Eastern allies, but does it signal a new phase in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
For Mansour, the issue is about more than just geopolitics—it’s about identity, history, and the right to return. He rejects the idea of mass displacement, pointing to the thousands of Palestinians who have already marched back to their destroyed neighborhoods. “We have very, very strong attachment to the land, whether it is you have a palace on it or whether it is destroyed,” he says. He also warns that Trump’s plan reflects a long-standing effort to erase Palestinian identity, arguing, “The Zionist movement has been working all along to push the idea that Palestine is a land without a people.
Mansour asks whether Gaza's future will be shaped by the people who live there or by the world's most powerful people.
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Finnish President Alexander Stubb smiles during an event with a blurred "World Economic Forum" background. The text art reads: "GZERO World with Ian Bremmer—the podcast."
What Trump's return means for Europe, with Finnish President Alexander Stubb
Listen: On the GZERO World Podcast, Finnish President Alexander Stubb joins Ian Bremmer in Davos, Switzerland, where world leaders, business executives, and diplomats gathered for the annual World Economic Forum. Just days after President Trump was sworn in for a second term, the mood in Davos was that of cold pragmatism. As Trump made clear in his speech to the Forum, Europe can no longer rely on the kind of copacetic relationship with the United States it had enjoyed since World War II or even during his first term.
So, what does that mean for Europe—and the war in Ukraine? Finland’s President Alexander Stubb and Ian Bremmer discuss.
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Big Tech and Trump 2.0: Nicholas Thompson on AI, Media, and Policy
Listen: What will the future of tech policy look like in a second Trump administration? And how will changes in the tech world—everything from the proliferation of AI and bots to the fragmentation of social media—impact how people talk, interact, and find information online? On the GZERO World Podcast, Nicholas Thompson, CEO of The Atlantic, joins Ian Bremmer to discuss the intersection of technology, media, and politics as Donald Trump prepares to return to the White House. Trump had a contentious relationship with the tech industry in his first term, but this time around, tech leaders are optimistic Trump 2.0 will be good for business, buoyed by hopes of loosening AI regulations, a crypto boom, and a more business-friendly administration. What does Big Tech stand to gain–or lose–from a second Trump presidency? Will Elon Musk help usher US tech policy into a new era, or will he create more chaos in the White House? And how concerned should we be about the dangers of AI-generated content online? Thompson and Bremmer break down the big changes in Big Tech and where the industry goes from here.
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What's next for Syria after Assad, with Beirut-based journalist and author Kim Ghattas
Listen: How did Syria’s government rule with an iron fist for five decades, only to collapse in two weeks? And after 14 years of bloody civil war, why was now the moment that a frozen war exploded into the global spotlight? The cost Syrians have already paid is greater than any nation could reasonably be expected to bear. Since 2011, more than 500,000 Syrians have died, including 200,000 civilians, and nearly six million refugees flooded neighboring Arab States and some European nations, most notably Germany.
But what comes next? Nature abhors a vacuum, and so does geopolitics. Iran, Russia, Israel, the Gulf states, and the United States all have vested interests in Syria's future, a country that this week's GZERO World with Ian Bremmer Podcast guest calls "the crown jewel" of proxy influence in the Middle East. Here to help make sense of these shocking past few weeks and the potential power vacuum to come is Kim Ghattas, a contributing editor at the Financial Times and author of Black Wave.
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What Donald Trump's second term will mean for the US economy
Listen: Donald Trump has promised to fix what he calls a broken economy and usher in a “golden age of America.” He’s vowed to implement record tariffs, slash regulation, and deport millions of undocumented immigrants. But what will that mean practically for America’s economic future? On the GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmer is joined by Oren Cass, founder and chief economist at the conservative think tank American Compass, to discuss Trump’s economic agenda and why Cass believes it will help American workers and businesses in the long run. Mass deportations, he says, will lead to a tighter labor market that will force employers to raise wages and increase working conditions. He also argues that steep tariffs are the only way to level the playing field with China, which has “flouted any concept of a free market or fair trade” for decades. However, many economists warn that Trump’s plan will lead to rising inflation and a global trade war. So what’s the biggest argument for an America first economic agenda? Will it really lead to long-term benefits for workers? Oren Cass makes his case.
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How Trump 2.0 could reshape US foreign policy, with the New York Times' David Sanger
Listen: On January 20, 2025, Donald Trump will re-assume the most powerful office in the world amidst the global backdrop of two major wars, comparatively weaker US allies, more aggressive rogue states, and a more complex and competitive international architecture. On the GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmer sits down with New York Times national security and White House correspondent David Sanger to talk about what US foreign policy might look like under Trump 2.0.
"It's a Donald Trump administration," Sanger tells Bremmer, which means that ideological consistency is not the currency of the moment. Loyalty is the currency of the moment." Some of Trump's picks so far show how important loyalty is to him and also that he's no longer going to defer to any "adults" in the room. He wants a cabinet that empowers him rather than reining him in. Moreover, Sanger notes that Trump will be taking the reins of the world’s most powerful office with the full support of the Senate, House, and a deeply conservative Supreme Court. Oh, and those moderating guardrails—like Mattis and Kelly—from the first Trump term? Gone. In short order, the entire world will know what Trump unleashed looks like. Whether or not that's a good thing...only time will tell.
Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.
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